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Insurance products are distributed both by independent and dependent agents, although the use 
of independent agents is more costly. The product quality hypothesis states that independent 
agents provide both insurers and customers with higher service quality and therefore, remain 
on the market. On the contrary, according to the market imperfections hypothesis both 
intermediary types offer the same quality, and only coexist due to information asymmetries. 
Having conducted a written survey, we measure service quality differences by multivariate 
regression analysis. Our analysis shows that the higher level of service quality of independent 
agents supports the product quality hypothesis. The result is a separating equilibrium on the 
market. 
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2  1 Introduction 
The liberalisation of the European insurance markets in 1994 has led to major changes in the 
German insurance market which was highly regulated until that moment. Consumers now face 
a higher number of insurance products and providers. At the same time, private old-age and 
health provision is gaining importance due to the decline in public health and old-age provision. 
Both factors lead to an increasing need for counselling by private customers, as insurance 
products can be characterized as credence or trust goods which present high information 
asymmetries and consequently, a high need for counselling. 
In most cases, insurance firms sell their products via agents which act as experts and help to 
overcome the information asymmetries between the insurance firm and the customers. Most 
insurance markets are characterized by the coexistence of different distribution systems. In 
many cases, insurance companies distribute their products at the same time via independent and 
exclusive intermediaries. Exclusive (dependent) agents act on behalf of one or more selected 
insurance companies, and are only allowed to sell the corresponding products. On the contrary, 
independent insurance agents (insurance brokers) act primarily on behalf of the insurance 
customer. They are free to choose the insurance products they sell and the companies they work 
with. Both exclusive and independent agents are paid for their services on a commission basis 
by the insurers. Independent agents are known to receive higher commissions for their services 
compared to exclusive agents, as the insurance company needs to ensure that the intermediary 
will act in its sense and not move the client to another insurer. But despite these potentially 
higher costs of the independent insurance agency system, both distribution systems prevail in 
the insurance industry. In the German market, exclusive agents were the dominant distribution 
channel until the liberalisation. Until then, independent agents have gained importance. 
This study explains the coexistence of independent and exclusive agents on the German 
insurance market from a customer’s point of view by analyzing the quality of service provided 
by independent and exclusive agents. It therefore offers an answer to the open questions how 
different distribution channels can coexist on insurance markets and how the liberalisation of 
the market has affected the importance of different distribution channels. 
Thus, this study adds new results to the existing research on the coexistence of distribution 
channels in insurance markets, and is the first one to analyse the question for the German 
market. Two main explanations for the coexistence of different distribution channels are 
provided in the existing literature,the product quality hypothesis and the market imperfections 
hypothesis. The product quality hypothesis states that the two systems coexist because they 
differ in the services they offer and the clientele they attract. As a result, the higher costs of the 
3  independent agency system are compensated by a higher level of service quality compared to 
exclusive agents (e.g. Barrese and Nelson, 1992). The result would be a separating equilibrium 
in the market where both types of intermediaries coexist. Independent insurance agents would 
rather focus on counselling-intensive, complex insurance products, whereas exclusive agents 
would specialize on standardised, less counselling-intensive insurance products. 
Opposed to that, the market imperfections hypothesis states that the distribution via exclusive 
agents on the one hand and the independent agency-based distribution system on the other do 
not differ in the quality they offer to the customer. The explanation for the coexistence of both 
systems rather lies in prevailing information asymmetries, preventing market transparency and 
the comparability of both distribution channels. Thus, the more cost-intensive independent 
agent-based distribution channel continues to exist only due to the information asymmetries on 
the market (Joskow, 1973; Cummins and VanDerhei, 1979, and Weiss, 1990). Those 
asymmetries may be attributed to a slow diffusion of information on insurance markets (Berger, 
Kleindorfer and Kunreuther, 1989), or to high search costs, which prevent inefficient firms 
from being identified (e.g. Dahlby and West, 1986). The result would be that both intermediary 
types would coexist on the market in a pooling eqilibrium, although the higher costs of the 
independent agency system are not reflected by a higher level of service quality. In the long 
run, the information asymmetries should decrease which would lead to a declining market share 
of independent intermediaries. But due to the large information asymmetries in insurance 
markets, it has also been suggested that independent intermediaries should be subject to a 
stricter regulation. 
This paper provides an empirical test of the product quality hypothesis against the market 
imperfections hypothesis. It represents the first test of these hypotheses on the German market 
for insurance intermediation. As in the German insurance market most insurers work at the 
same time with independent and exclusive insurance agents, hypotheses are directly tested by 
measuring the service quality provided by exclusive and independent insurance agents on the 
basis of selected quality indicators. There are only two studies which compare exclusive and 
independent agents on the German market: Eckardt (2002) employs mean differences 
parametric tests to identify differences in quantitative and qualitative variables describing the 
information and counselling behaviour of the agents. She shows that independent agents 
provide higher information quality. These results are confirmed in a second study using the 
same data (Eckardt 2007): multivariate estimations show that the information quality provided 
by insurance intermediaries increases with their independence from insurance companies. 
However, Eckardt does not center in the explanation of the coexistence of both distribution 
4  channels, but in the working of signalling instruments in the market for insurance 
intermediation, among them the intermediary type. Thus, this study represents a completion to 
the previous work in this field. 
Methodologically, an online survey among approximately 3,500 exclusive and independent 
German insurance intermediaries was carried out in Spring 2005. Different quality indicators 
have been chosen as proxy variables for quality of service. They can be split up in two groups: 
the first group includes indicators describing the input quality delivered by the insurance 
intermediary, whereas the second group contains indicators for the output quality of the 
intermediation services. The analysis of both the input activities of the intermediary,as well as 
the results of his counselling activities gives a more complete insight in the provided service 
quality as in case of only analsing one group of indicators.  
Multivariate results indicate that the product quality hypothesis holds true for the German 
market: Compared to exclusive agents, independent agents show higher levels of service quality 
both in terms of the analysed input quality indicators and the output quality indicators. 
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2, the theoretical background is presented and an 
overview of earlier studies is given. Section 3 illustrates the empirical design of this study, 
gives an overview about the applied variables, and presents the estimation approach. In section 
4, the main descriptive results and the results of the multivariate estimations are presented. 
Conclusions are drawn in section 5. 
2  Theoretical background and previous research 
Compared to exclusive insurance agents, independent insurance brokers are known to have 
higher expense ratios (e.g. Zweifel and Ghermi, 1990).
1 The higher expenses of independent 
agents can be explained by the property rights structure of the relationship between insurer and 
agent: While dependent agents do not have the ownership of the client list, independent agents 
have the right to policy renewal. Independent agents directly contact the customer at the end of 
the contract period and decide which of the insurers represented will receive the renewal 
business. Therefore, typically independent agent renewal commissions are higher than the 
commission level in exclusive distribution systems, as the insurer must ensure that an 
independent agent acts in his sense and does not move the client to another insurer. Thus, 
insurers incur higher monitoring costs in case of dealing with independent agents (Barrese and 
Nelson, 1992). 
                                                 
1 As information about individual compensation levels of insurance intermediaries is usually not available, there 
are only few studies which analyse the renumeration of insurance intermediaries.  
5  According to the product quality hypothesis, the higher costs of the independent agency system 
are justified by a higher level of service quality which is delivered by independent agents 
compared to exclusive agents. This supposed higher level of service quality can be analysed 
from a supply side-oriented view. In this case, it is the insurance company which receives a 
higher level of quality by the services of an independent agent (e.g. Regan (1997), 
Regan/Tennyson (1996), Anderson/Ross/Weitz (1998)). The higher level of service quality can 
also be analysed from a demand side-oriented view according to the information channelling-
argument (Finsinger and Schmid 1994). According to this argument, insurance brokers provide 
a higher level of service quality to the customers. This higher service quality is perceived by the 
customers and leads to an increased demand for services by independent agents. This increased 
demand justifies the use of independent agents by insurance companies despite of the higher 
costs these agents incur. As in this study, the consequences of the liberalisation of the insurance 
market on the need for counselling of the customer are in the centre of interest, the service 
quality is tested from a demand-oriented view. 
Several demand side-oriented arguments for a higher service quality of independent agents can 
be found in previous work: The central reason for the higher level of quality by independent 
agents can be found in the seminal paper by Grossman and Hart (1986): under the distribution 
by dependent agents, the insurance company owns the client list, and thus, controls the relevant 
assets to its clients and decides if policies are going to be renewed.
2 In case of an independent 
agency system, it is the agent who owns the client list. Grossman and Hart state that this 
difference in the ownership of the client list will lead to higher investments in the client list by 
independent agents compared to exclusive agents. These higher investments made by the 
independent agent are reflected in the effort with which the insurance policy is chosen and 
designed, and in the efficiency when dealing with claims settlement. The higher effort results in 
a higher level of service quality. 
There are further arguments for a higher level of service quality by independent agents: In 
contrast to exclusive agents who only work for a single or few insurance firms, insurance 
brokers compare the products of different providers and give better informed advice to the 
customer, as they represent different insurers in their portfolio. By this, they reduce the search 
costs of the customer (Posey and Tennyson, 1998). From a customer’s point of view, higher 
service quality could also consist in a better monitoring of the insurer by brokers (Regan, 1997). 
Important monitoring functions are, for example: screening different insurers for appropriate 
                                                 
2 The ownership of the client list can be seen as the relevant asset in this relationship. 
6  coverages, low prices, and financial stability. Mayers and Smith (1981) and Barrese and Nelson 
(1992) also state that independent agents are more capable to deal with conflicts between 
insurers and policy holders, as they can threat with moving the customer to another insurer. As 
a compensation for this service, they receive higher renumeration compared to exclusive agents.  
Summarizing, it can be stated that there are several arguments in the literature that support the 
product quality hypothesis. As a result, a separating equilibrium should result in the market for 
insurance intermediation with independent agents engaging in rather complex insurance lines 
where the need of information by the customer is comparatively high and thus, a high level of 
service quality is of great importance. In contrast to that, exclusive agents would rather focus on 
standardized insurance products. As information and counselling of the customer are of lower 
importance in these cases, insurance firms would mainly distribute these products by less cost-
intensive exclusive agencies. 
In the majority of previous studies dealing with this issue, service quality of insurance agents 
has not been measured directly. Instead, cost and revenue functions of insurers working 
exclusively with exclusive agents on the one hand, and those working solely with independent 
agents on the other hand were estimated to compare cost and revenue levels of either 
distribution system. The results are mixed: while in most cases, independent agents are found to 
deliver higher service quality (e.g. Cummins and Weisbart, 1977, Barrese and Nelson, 1992, 
Barrese et al., 1995, and Berger et al. 1997), some studies do not find significant differences in 
service quality by exclusive and independent agents (e.g Klumpes, 2004) or even evidence for 
higher quality of exclusive agents (Joskow, 1973, Etgar,1976).  
3  Empirical design and estimation approach 
The data used is obtained from an online survey which was carried out in Spring 2005. The 
online questionnaire was sent to some 3,500 German exclusive and independent insurance 
intermediaries. The e-mail addresses were randomly chosen from different sources like online 
directories, registers of members of professional organizations, and registers of members of 
chambers of commerce and industry.
3  
We asked for attributes of the interviewee like age, professional experience (in years), status 
(exclusive or independent agent), the professional qualification level (formation level and 
                                                 
3 There is no legal duty to register for insurance intermediaries in the German market until the year 2007 and thus, 
no central register is available to obtain adresses of insurance intermediaries.  
 
7  additional skills), and the membership in a professional organization. Concerning the formation 
level, different formation levels available on the German market were classified from 1 to 6 
with level 1 being the lowest and level 6 the highest qualification level.  
Structural variables contain information about firm size (measured by the number of 
employees), product range (number of services provided besides the mediation of insurance 
products), degree of specialisation (measured by the percentage of insurance contracts signed in 
private customer insurance lines), and share of complex insurance products which are sold by 
the intermediary. The following insurance lines have been characterized as complex insurance 
lines: ageing provision, commercial insurance, industrial insurance, and private health 
insurance. Compared to more standardised insurance lines, for the more complex lines the 
conditions of insurance usually are formulated individually by the intermediary according to the 
customer’s needs and preferences. 
To test the product quality hypothesis, it is necessary to define and measure service quality. 
According to Eckardt (2007), intermediaries provide information, advisory, bargaining, and 
administrative services. According to the different service components, several indicators for 
the input quality of the intermediary’s services have been selected in this study belonging to the 
categories of acquisition and transfer of information, as well as documentation activities. The 
second group of quality indicators contains indicators for the output quality. Eckardt (2007) 
uses two different measures for the performance of intermediaries: First, an information index 
is considered to measure the weight intermediaries attach to 27 different subjects about 
customer’s need for insurance protection, insurance products and coverage, policy design and 
contract terms. Second, the contract conclusion rate is also considered as a proxy for economic 
success, and thus, also indirectly for service quality. The difference to the quality concept by 
Eckardt (2007) lies in the fact that in our case, service quality is not only measured by an 
information quality index, but by single variables which describe the quality of the 
intermediaries’ input. Thus, this study does not only focus on the quality of information which 
is provided, but also on the intermediaries’ activities. Further, as this study centres on the 
service quality from a customer’s point of view, in case of the output quality, the lapse rate and 
the share of new customers in the intermediary’s portfolio are considered besides the contract 
conclusion rate. The following table 1 describes all advisory service quality indicators which 
have been selected for multivariate analyses.
4
                                                 
4 The choice of the quality indicators for the multivariate estimations occurred on the basis of the results of mean 
differences parametric tests for all quality indicators which were included into the questionnaire.  
8  [Table 1 about here] 
The influence of the selected indicators on the level of advisory service quality can be 
explained as follows:  
−  ASQ 1: Working time information acquisition: The more time is spent on information 
acquisition, the better advise the intermediary is able to give ceteris paribus. If the 
product quality hypothesis holds true, independent agents should show a higher share of 
working time which is spent on information acquisition, as they have to collect and 
analyse information about a higher number of suppliers and products.  
−  ASQ 2: Importance of rating agencies: Rating agencies help to overcome information 
asymmetries on insurance markets by analyzing and comparing the performance of 
different insurance firms and products. As these rating agencies do not act on behalf of 
insurance firms or customer associations, their information can be seen as objective. 
Further, the information is of high quality as these rating agencies are specialized on 
insurance topics. Thus, the higher the value an intermediary attaches to information by 
rating agencies, the higher the service quality he is expected to deliver to the customer 
ceteris paribus. 
−  ASQ  3: Risk analysis: To determine the insurance demand of a customer, the 
intermediary has to analyse the risk profile of the customer as a first step. For this, 
information about personal characteristics, risk preferences, the financial and 
professional situation, as well as about existing insurance coverage of the customer have 
to be collected and processed. Due to the high number and complexity of the 
information, service quality is expected to increase from 1 (subjective classification of 
the client’s risk profile) to 3 (computer-assisted determination of the customer’s risk 
profile), as information about the customer’s risk profile is processed more 
professionally. 
−  ASQ  4: Documentation counselling interview: A possible miscounselling by the 
intermediary can only be detected if a record of the counselling interview exists which 
could prove that the intermediary failed to inform the customer about relevant 
characteristics of the insurance product (e.g., high costs in case of an early cancellation 
of a life insurance contract). Until summer of 2007, there will be no legal duty for an 
insurance intermediary in the German market to deliver a record of the counselling 
interview. Thus, the voluntary delivery of a record can be seen as a signalling 
instrument to demonstrate a high level of service quality. 
9  −  ASQ 5: Contract conclusion rate: The higher the share of counselling interviews which 
lead to the signing of an insurance contract, the more successful an intermediary is in 
analyzing the relevant information and choosing suitable contracts for the customers. 
Thus, it can be expected that insurance intermediaries who show a higher contract 
conclusion rate offer higher service quality to their customer. 
−  ASQ 6: Lapse rate automobile insurance: The reason for a cancellation of an insurance 
contract during the first year after the signing of the contract demonstrates the 
dissatisfaction of the customer, and can be seen as an indicator for a low level of 
advisory quality by the intermediary. A lower lapse rate therefore indicates higher 
service quality ceteris paribus. 
−  ASQ 7: Share of turnover new customers: A higher share of turnover by new customers 
indicates a faster growth of the agency. The higher growth can be explained by a higher 
perceived level of quality which leads to a higher demand by the customer. This 
relationship holds only true, if the rate of cancelled contracts in the intermediary’s 
portfolio is simultaneously checked and does not show a positive influence on the share 
of turnover by new customers. Otherwise, the high share of turnover by new customers 
could also be generated by high lapse rates, i.e. by the loss of existing customers (see 
section 4 for details). 
To estimate the influence of the intermediary’s status on service quality, the selected quality 
indicators presented above have been used as dependent variables in the multivariate models 
presented in the following. As explanatory variables, the following variables are considered: 
−  Intermediary type: A dummy variable differentiates between exclusive (0) and 
independent insurance agents (1). Following the product quality hypothesis, we 
expected that independent agents supply better service quality, thus, the variable 
showing a positive sign. 
−  Firm size: This variable is measured on the basis of the number of employees, as data 
about turnover is not available. The expected influence on service quality is positive, as 
we assume increasing economies of scale to be realized during the acquisition and 
procession of information. This would make it possible to provide a given level of 
information at lower costs (see also Eckardt 2007).  
−  Product range describes the number of services the intermediary offers besides the 
mediation of insurance products. Services like investment counselling, financial advice, 
investment fund management, asset management, and real estate agency are considered. 
10 The expected influence on service quality is positive, as economies of scope are 
expected to exist for the supply of different services. For example, information gained 
about the risk profile of a customer can be used for supplying the customer with 
different products. The costs for obtaining these information can thus be distributed 
among different services (see also Eckardt 2007). 
−  Share of complex insurance products specifies the ratio of complex insurance policies 
(policies belonging to the insurance lines ageing provision, private health insurance, 
commercial insurance, and industrial insurance) to the total number of policies. The 
variable ranges between 0 and 1, and the expected influence on advisory service quality 
is positive as intermediaries with a higher share of complex insurance products in their 
portfolio have to meet higher requirements considering the acquisition and transfer of 
information which leads to higher service quality. 
−  Membership in a professional organization:  The dummy variable takes the value of 1 if 
the intermediary is member in a professional organization and 0, otherwise. 
Membership in a professional organization is often linked to the fulfilment of certain 
quality standards (e.g. minimum qualification level, rules of conduct, professional 
indemnity insurance). Therefore, it can be seen as an instrument to signal a high level of 
quality. Thus, a positive influence on advisory service quality is expected. 
Summarizing, we formulate the following hypotheses: 
H1:  Independent agents show higher levels of service quality compared to exclusive agents 
measured by the presented service quality indicators. 
H2:  The service quality provided is positively influenced by firm size, product range, share 
of complex insurance products in the portfolio, and membership in a professional 
organization. 
4 Results 
The data set consists of 608 answered questionnaires, where exclusive (58.4 percent) and 
independent agents (41.6 percent) have nearly the same share. Tied or exclusive agents 
belonging to a single or several insurance companies or an insurance group, respectively, have 
11 been classified as exclusive agents. Insurance brokers and financial consultants
5 have been 
classified as independent agents.
6
Table 2 summarizes the main descriptive statistics comparing the mean values of the structural 
and exogenous variables for the groups of independent and exclusive agents. 
[Table 2 about here] 
The results for the structural variables show that exclusive agents have on average a larger 
client base: Tied agents act as agents for 1,565 customers, whereas independent brokers only 
act on behalf of 1,106 clients. The reason for this could lie in the lower commission levels of 
exclusive agents, and in less time-intensive services by exclusive agents which permit the 
consultancy of more clients. As to the qualification level and professional experience, both 
groups do not seem to differ: exclusive agents show an average formation level of 2.94. 
Concerning the professional experience, both groups show a mean value of nearly 17 years. 
Regarding the number of insurers which are represented by the agent, exclusive agents have 
less insurance companies they work for (6.98 on average) compared to independent agents who 
offer products of approx. 51 insurers to their customers on average.  
Analyzing the explanatory variables which are considered in the multivariate estimations, the 
following can be found: The firm size clearly differs between both types of agents: exclusive 
agencies have 2.94 employees on average, while independent agencies are larger with 5.08 
employees at the mean. Both groups offer a comparable range of products besides insurance 
products to their customers, but independent agents have a larger share of complex insurance 
products in their portfolio. The distribution of the intermediaries’ portfolios into the single 
insurance lines is going to be analysed in detail at the end of this section. Independent 
intermediaries are also more often members in professional organizations. 
Finally, the mean values of the presented advisory service quality indicators are also presented 
for both groups: In all cases, independent intermediaries represent higher values of service 
                                                 
5 Financial consultants are usually not tied to one or several companies and thus, they have been classified as 
independent agents, although the title is not linked to any requirements concerning the formation of  these agents. 
6 As there is no legal duty to register for insurance intermediaries in Germany until 2007, the total population is 
unknown. There is also only limited information about the distribution of the different intermediary types in the 
total population: In 2004, the majority (320,000 of 405,000 intermediaries) acted as part-time intermediaries. As 
they only account for a small amount of the total premium income, only full-time intermediaries are considered in 
this study. In case of full-time intermediaries, the GDV (Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft –
German Insurance Association) estimates that 78,000 are dependent agents (exclusive or multiple agents which are 
linked to one or several insurance companies) and 7,000 are independent insurance agents (GDV 2004). But due to 
the non-existence of a registration duty until today, these figures are only rough estimates. Thus, it is not possible 
to detect a potential selection bias in the data.  
12 quality compared to exclusive agents.
7 In a next step, multivariate estimations prove if the 
differences in service quality between both groups continue to exist when considering the 
chosen exogenous variables. Table 3 shows the results of the models analyzing the impact of 
the exogenous variables on the four selected input quality indicators (ASQ 
1-4). Table 4 presents 
the results for the three output quality indicators (ASQ 
5-7). Multicollinearity between the 
independent variables has been tested in the forefront of conducting the multivariate 
estimations, but no indication could be found. 
8
The dependent variables range between 0 and 1 for the models 1, and 5 to 7. As the variables 
are continously distributed between 0 and 1, Ordinary Least Squares Regressions (OLS) were 
estimated for these models. The dependent variables in models 2 and 3 are ordinal variables 
ranging from 1 to 5 (model 2), and 1 to 3 (model 3), respectively. Thus, we estimate a 
Maximum Likelihood estimator for ordered variables (Ordered Probit). Finally, model 4 was 
estimated with a Maximum Likelihood Binary Logit estimator, as the dependent variable is 
binary.
9  
As models 2 to 4 are limited dependent variable models, the estimated coefficients cannot be 
directly interpreted as the marginal effects of the associated exogenous variables. However, the 
direction of the effect of a change in an exogenous variable can be deduced from the sign of the 
coefficients: positive parameter values imply that an increase of the exogenous variable will 
increase the probability that the intermediary is independent (yi = 1) in case of the Binary Logit 
model. In case of the Ordered Probit models, a positive coefficient is interpreted in the 
following way: In model 2, it implies that increasing the exogenous variable will increase the 
probability that the intermediary considers information by rating agencies as totally 
unimportant (yi= 5), and decrease the probability that the intermediary attaches high importance 
to these information (yi= 1), but the probabilities of being in the intermediate categories could 
move in either direction. In model 3, a positive parameter value increases the probability that 
the intermediary conduces a computer-assisted determinance of the customer’s risk profile (yi= 
3) and decreases the probability that only a subjective classification of the costumer’s risk 
                                                 
7 According to the conducted t-test, the differences between the mean values proved all to be significant. 
8 The use of self-reporting variables as considered in this study raises the problem of a possible response bias. 
Interviewees asked about their performance tend to exaggerate. However, it can be assumed that the response bias 
occurs for all interviewees similarly, i.e. that there is no systematic difference between the groups of exclusive and 
independent insurance agents. 
9 Detailed information about the Ordered Probit model can be found in Zavoina and McElvey (1975). The Binary 
Logit model is analysed in detail e.g. in Cox (1970). A general overview about limited dependent data analysis can 
be found in Agresti (1990). 
13 profile is conducted (yi= 1), but again, the probability of being in the intermediate category 
could move in either direction. In case of the OLS models, the coefficients can be interpreted as 
marginal effects.
10  
[Table 3 about here] 
[Table 4 about here] 
Model 1 analyses the influence of the independent variables on the share of working time which 
is spent for information acquisition. The results indicate that independent insurance brokers 
spent more of their working time on information gathering compared to exclusive 
intermediaries. This can be interpreted as that they show a higher level of service quality, as 
predicted by the product quality hypothesis. This result is highly significant on a 1 percent-
level.  
Model 2 shows the result for the second quality indicator, the importance intermediaries attach 
to the information delivered by independent rating agencies. Again, independent intermediaries 
attach higher importance to information of independent rating agencies than exclusive agents 
do.
11 The coefficient is significant on a 1 percent-level. As expected, the importance of 
independent information also increases with membership in a professional organization, the 
coefficient being significant on a 5 percent-level.  
The third model analyses the design of the risk analysis. Here, independent intermediaries do 
not show a higher level of service quality. However, it can be stated that a larger product range 
increases the probability that a computer assisted risk analysis is conducted by the intermediary. 
Firm size does not show the expected sign: a growing firm size lowers the likelihood of a 
computer assisted risk analysis being conducted, although the size of the coefficient is very 
small. The results also show that an increasing share of complex insurance products in the 
intermediary’s portfolio increases the probability that the risk analysis is carried out more 
professionally.  
Model 4 measures the level of service quality on the basis of the question if a record of the 
counselling interview is prepared by the intermediary. Here, again, the fact of being an 
independent insurance broker increases the likelihood of a record being made after a 
                                                 
10  We further conducted tests to check for possible heteroscedasticity of the residuals (e.g. Greene, 2003). 
Insignificant variables were omitted, the reported model specifications showed the highest explanatory power of 
all specifications: this was proved by stepwise including the reported exogenous variables and comparing the 
results for the single coefficients and the overall test statistics. 
11 Note that according to the coding of the variable Importance rating agencies negative (positive) coefficients 
indicate a positive (negative) impact on service quality.  
14 counselling interview. This relationship is highly significant on a 1 percent-level. Further, as 
expected, a larger product range in the intermediary’s portfolio raises the likelihood of a record 
on a level of significance of 1 percent. Also, the share of complex insurance products in the 
intermediary’s portfolio has a positive influence on the service quality, which is significant on a 
5 percent-level. 
In addition to the models 1-4 which seek to explain input quality indicators, models 5 to 7 use 
output quality indicators. Model 5 analyses the contract conclusion rate of counselling 
interviews. Independent insurance agents realize higher contract conclusion rates compared to 
exclusive agents (level of significance: 1 percent). Further, the contract conclusion rate 
increases with a growing product range in the intermediary’s portfolio, as could be expected, 
although the marginal effect is much smaller in this case.  
Model 6 uses the second output quality indicator, the lapse rate in the automobile insurance 
line. This insurance line is well suited for an analysis of the lapse rate, as automobile insurance 
contracts can be cancelled comparatively easily at low costs. Therefore, significant lapse rates 
can be found in this insurance line.
12 An additional exogenous variable which measures the 
share of private customers in the intermediary’s portfolio (“share of private customers”
13) was 
included into this model. The reason is that automobile insurance contracts are signed in most 
cases by private customers and thus, it should be tested for the influence of the intermediary’s 
specialisation on private customers on the lapse rate in this insurance line. 
The results show that the fact of being an independent insurance broker lowers the chance of 
automobile insurance policies being cancelled indicating a higher service quality of 
independent insurance agents compared to exclusive ones (level of significance: 1 percent).
14 
Further, also a larger share of complex insurance products shows the expected influence on 
service quality: the lapse rate is reduced with the relationship being significant on a 1 percent-
level. This result shows that a large share of complex insurance products has a positive 
                                                 
12 We also examined lapse rate in long-term, more complex insurance lines (e.g. private health insurance, long-
term life insurance policies). In all cases, the lapse rates found were much smaller, and the models proved not to be 
overall significant. A reason could be that the cancellation of these insurance types incurs much higher costs for 
the customer. Further, these insurance types are rather credence goods which exhibit large information 
asymmetries which could also explain why the lapse rates are much smaller as in case of the rather standardized 
private automobile insurance. 
13 The variable ranges between 0 and 1 and measures the ratio of private customers to the total number of 
customers in the intermediary’s portfolio. 
14 Note that according to the coding of the variable Lapse rate auto insurance negative (positive) coefficients 
indicate a positive (negative) impact on service quality. 
 
15 influence on the service quality of the intermediary, and that the effect also results in a lower 
lapse rate in case of a rather standardized insurance line, like the private automobile insurance. 
The included variable share of private customers shows a negative coefficient (level of 
significance: 1 percent): i.e., intermediaries with a larger share of private customers show a 
lower lapse rate in the auto insurance line. This effect could be explained by learning effects 
which are realized with an increasing number of customers in a certain insurance line. This 
could also explain the result that a higher product range leads to a higher lapse rate: 
Intermediaries who focus on the distribution of insurance products are able to specialize on this 
service, whereas those intermediaries who offer a broad range of services do not realize this 
specialisation effects, and thus, deliver lower service quality in this case.  
Model 7 finally analyses the dependent variable share of turnover which is generated by new 
customers. An additional exogenous variable which measures the professional experience of the 
intermediary in years (“professional experience”) was included into this model. It is important 
to test the influence of the intermediary`s professional experience in this case, as it can be 
hypothesised that intermediaries gain a larger share of their turnover by new customers at the 
beginning of their career due to the need of building up a customer base. Thus, intermediaries 
with a long working experience should obtain a smaller part of their turnover by new 
customers. Further, it is important to test for the influence of the share of  contracts which were 
cancelled in the period (“total lapse rate”): If this variable showed a positive influence on the 
share of turnover which is generated by new customers, the high share of turnover by new 
customers would be, at least partly, generated by high lapse rates, i.e. by the loss of existing 
customers. In this case, the higher share of turnover by new customers would be attributed to a 
high lapse rate and thus, a low level of service quality. In that case, it would not indicate a 
higher growth due to higher quality of service, and the variable could not serve as an indicator 
for the output quality. 
The results of the model demonstrate that the higher share of turnover does not result from the 
cancellation of contracts by existing cutomers, as the included variable total lapse rate has no 
influence on the share of turnover by new customers. Hence, the share of turnover by new 
customers serves as a indicator for higher growth and for higher output quality, as 
hypothezised. Analyzing the results, independent brokers show a higher share of new 
customers, i.e. independent agencies grow faster compared to dependent agencies. But the 
impact on the share of turnover by new customers is even stronger when the exogenous 
variables share of complex insurance products, and membership in a professional organisation 
are considered. A comparison of the coefficients’ size shows that the effects are larger 
16 compared to the influence of the intermediary type. The included variable “professional 
experience” also shows the expected negative sign: The share of turnover which is gained by 
new customers decreases with a larger professional experience, although the coefficient size is 
rather small.  
Summarizing, our data give evidence that independent agents provide a higher level of service 
quality measured by the presented quality indicators, with only one exception. Six of seven 
models indicate that the product quality hypothesis holds true. In all these cases, independent 
insurance brokers show a higher level of service quality measured by the presented quality 
indicators. As to the remaining exogenous variables, the share of complex insurance products 
has a positive influence on the measured service quality. As in case of complex insurance 
products, intermediaries have to meet higher requirements considering the acquisition and 
transfer of information, service quality increases with an increasing share of complex insurance 
products. In case of the remaining exogenous variables, the membership in a professional 
organization also shows the expected influence on the level of service quality in two cases. This 
result shows that intermediaries who meet the requirements for a membership in a professional 
organization (e.g. minimum qualification level, rules of conduct, professional indemnity 
insurance), deliver higher service quality to their customers. The results are mixed in case of the 
product range: a larger product range rises the service quality offered in case of models 3 to 5 
which may indicate economies of scope which are realized during the acquisition and 
processing of information. In case of model 6, a larger product range has a negative influence 
on the service quality, as it leads to a growing lapse rate. In that case, a larger product range 
seems to impede the realization of specialisation effects by the intermediary. Finally, the firm 
size does not seem to have a relevant influence on service quality. Thus, the expected 
increasing economies of scale during the acquisition and procession of information do not seem 
to be associated with a higher level of service quality. 
The theoretical considerations in chapter 2 suggest that according to the product quality 
hypothesis there is a separating equilibrium on the market for insurance intermediation with 
independent agents mediating more complex and less standardised products, and exclusive 
insurance agents selling more standardised products. The descriptive results already showed 
that independent intermediaries have a larger share of complex insurance products in their 
portfolio (see table 2). This result is analysed in more detail in table 5 which shows the share of 
single insurance lines in the intermediary’s portfolio. Ageing provision, commercial insurance, 
industrial insurance, and private health insurance are characterized as rather complex insurance 
17 lines, whereas private property insurance, automobile insurance and private indemnity 
insurance are rather standardized insurance products.  
[Table 5 about here] 
The results of this survey partly confirm the hypothesis of a separating equilibrium: 
independent agents show higher shares of turnover in complex insurance lines like industrial 
insurance, ageing provision, and commercial insurance lines, as expected. In contrast to that, 
exclusive agents show higher shares of turnover in only one standardised line, the private 
property insurance. 
Surprisingly, exclusive agents show a higher share of turnover in the private health insurance 
line compared to independent agents. This contrasts to our expectation that independent agents 
would dominate in this complex insurance line. In case of automobile insurance contracts, 
which are rather standardized, a predominance of exclusive agents could have been expected. 
However, there is hardly any difference between the share of turnover of both groups, which 
may be due to the fact that automobile insurance contracts are often used as first contact to 
future customers with the aim of building up a long-term relationship to the customer. Hence, 
both types of intermediaries are interested in selling this type of insurance. 
The analysis of the share of turnovers in different insurance lines clearly shows that 
independent agents are represented above-average in some complex insurance lines. But 
according to our data set, exclusive agents do not seem to act primarily in standardized 
insurance lines.  
5 Conclusions   
The coexistance of different distribution systems in insurance markets has often been a subject 
of research in the past. In this study, the situation in the German market for insurance 
intermediation is analysed: Until the liberalisation of the European insurance markets in 1994, 
exclusive, firm-own agents were the dominant distribution channel in the German market, but 
since then, independent agents are gaining importance. There are two hypotheses which seek to 
explain the coexistence of both distribution systems: According to the market imperfections 
hypothesis, the more cost-intensive independent distribution channel only continues to exist due 
to persisting information asymmetries which prevent a market overview. Both distribution 
systems offer the same quality. The contrary product quality hypothesis accredits a higher 
service quality to independent agents compared to exclusive agents. The market for insurance 
intermediation would result in a separating equilibrium.  
18 The aim of this study is to explain the coexistence of independent and exclusive agents on the 
German insurance market. For this, the quality of service provided by independent and 
exclusive agents is analysed from a customer’s point of view and the product quality hypothesis 
is proved. By the obtained results, it is able to explain the coexistence of both distribution 
channels in the German market, as well as the increasing importance of independent 
intermediaries since the liberalisation of the German market. 
The results of our analysis show that the product quality hypothesis seems to hold true in the 
German life insurance market, when exclusive and independent insurance intermediaries are 
compared with each other: In six of seven analysed models, independent agents show a higher 
level of service quality compared to exclusive agents. This holds true both for indicators of the 
input and output quality of the provided services. Besides the fact of being an independent 
intermediary, service quality also increases with a growing share of complex insurance products 
in the intermediary’s portfolio and the membership in a professional organization. The analysis 
of the insurance portfolios further indicates that, at least partly, the existence of a separating 
equilibrium in the market can be confirmed: Independent agents show larger market shares in 
most complex insurance lines, whereas the dominance of exclusive agents in rather 
standardized lines is only proved for the private property insurance. 
Thus, independent agents seem to be able to deliver higher service quality which is of special 
importance in case of complex, long-term insurance products. This higher level of service 
quality justifies the higher costs of this distribution channel and is able to explain the growing 
importance of this distribution channel since the liberalisation of the market. As a consequence 
of market liberalization and deregulation, the number of products and providers has increased. 
At the same time, private health and old-age provision is gaining importance, as the public 
health and pension coverage is declining. Both facts lead an increasing demand for intensive 
counselling and high-quality advisory services by independent intermediaries. As the 
importance of complex insurance products is expected to increase in the future (above all in the 
fields of private old-age and health provision), it can also be expected that the importance of 
independent insurance agents will continue to increase in the German market.  
Thus, the results of our study do not only contribute to the explanation of the market structure 
in the German market for insurance intermediation, but are also of special interest for 
consumers, professional organizations of insurance intermediaries, and consumer associations, 
as they give an answer to the open question of differences in service quality levels in the market 
for insurance intermediation. 
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21 Table 1:  Advisory Service Quality Indicators (ASQ) 
 
Source: own design 
Variable Definition 
ASQ 1:  
Working time information 
acquisition 
Ratio of time budget spent on information acquisition to total time 
budget 
ASQ 2:  
Importance of rating 
agencies 
Importance assessed to the information by rating agencies on a five-
point rating scale (with 1=very important, 5=completely unimportant) 
ASQ 3:  
Risk analysis 
Design of the analysis of the customer’s risk profile (Measured on a 1 
to 3 scale:  
1: subjective classification of the client’s risk profile; 2: grading of the 
client’s risk profile in given risk categories; 3: computer-assisted 
determination of the customer’s risk profile) 
ASQ 4:  
Documentation counselling 
interview 
Binary variable (No/Yes) which describes if the counselling interview 
is documented, and if the record is stored and handed out to the 
customer (Yes = 1) 
ASQ 5:  
Contract conclusion rate 
Ratio of counselling interviews which led to the signing of an insurance 
contract to total number of counselling interviews 
ASQ 6: 
Lapse rate automobile 
insurance 
Share of contracts in automobile insurance cancelled during the first 12 
months after signing the contract 
ASQ 7: 
Turnover new customers 
Share of turnover which is gained by the conclusion of contracts with 
new customers 23
 
Table 2:  Descriptive results 
 




Structural variables     
Number of customers  1565  1106 
Qualification level (1-6)  2.7478  2.7480 
Number of insurers in the portfolio  6.98  51.07 
Professional experience (years)  16.93  16.59 
Independent variables    
Firm size  2.94  5.08 
Product range  3.80  3.37 
Share of complex insurance products in 
portfolio (mean)  0.39 0.44 
Membership in a professional organization  0.29  0.35 
Advisory Service Quality Indicators    
ASQ 1: Working time information acquisition  0.21 0.35 
ASQ 2: Importance of rating agencies  2.32 1.88 
ASQ 3: Risk analysis  1.91 1.96 
ASQ 4: Documentation counselling interview  0.28 0.57 
ASQ 5: Contract conclusion rate  0.48 0.68 
ASQ 6:Lapse rate automobile insurance  0.0385 0.0180 
ASQ 7: Share of turnover by new customers  0.24 0.31 
Source: own calculations ; All values are group mean values. Table 3:  Estimation results – Input quality indicators (ASQ 1-4) 
 
  Model 1 
ASQ 1: 












Record of counselling 
interview (Yes/No) 



















































n   
       
297  374  428  423
R
2 (adjusted) 0.1653 0.0839
4
LR statistic










1Significant on 10 %-, 5 %-, and 1 %-level: *, **, and ***; z- values in parentheses (t-values in case of model 1). 
2 Measured on a five-point rating scale: 1 = very important…5 = totally unimportant 
3 Measured on a three-point rating scale: 1: subjective classification of the client’s risk profile; 2: grading of the client’s risk profile in given risk categories; 3: computer-
assisted determination of the customer’s risk profile 
4 Mc Fadden R
2 
5F statistic and (Prob(F stat) 
Source: own estimations, estimated with “EViews 5.0".  
Table 4:  Estimation results – Output quality indicators (ASQ 5-7) 
 
























































Professional experience      -0.004* 
(-1.947) 








Estimation method  OLS  OLS   
n 295  209  190 
R
2 (adjusted)
  0.1826 0.1327 0.1720 
F statistic 







1Significant on 10 %-, 5 %-, and 1 %-level: *, **, and ***; t- values in parentheses. 
2 White-heteroscedasticity-consistent-OLS estimation 
Source: own estimations, estimated with “EViews 5.0". Table 5:    Shares of turnover in different insurance lines 
 





Industrial insurance     
mean 0.0136  0.0390    0.0221 
(std. dev.)  0.0958  0.134  0.110 
Ageing provision     
mean  0.2152   0.2423   0.2235 
(std. dev.)  0.193  0.220  0.202 
Commercial insurance     
mean 0.0702  0.1153  0.0836 
(std. dev)  0.0976  0.141  0.1140 
Private health insurance      
mean 0.0965  0.0619  0.0862 
(std. dev.)  0.1702  0.0642  0.1475 
Private property insurance     
mean 0.2330  0.1784  0.2170 
(std. dev)  0.1403  0.1296  0.1392 
Automobile insurance     
mean 0.2520  0.2502  0.2512 
(std. dev)  0.1804  0.1829  0.1813 
Private indemnity insurance     
mean 0.1337  0.1544  0.1398 
(std. dev)  0.0869  0.1177  0.0971 
Source: own calculations; Turnover is measured by the ratios of placed insurance policies in the  
different insurance lines to the total number of placed policies, as data about financial turnover 
 is not available 
 
 
 
 
 